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1. Context 
 
This discussion paper summarises some of the key points that were raised at a recent cross 
industry workshop run by the Energy Policy Group on the future of gas and electricity code 
governance in October 2015. More details of the event are available on the IGov website.  
 
Energy industry codes are the technical and commercial rules that sit at the heart of the energy 
system in Great Britain. Codes are incorporated into standard licence conditions for generators, 
network companies and suppliers. In total there are 17 different codes for gas and electricity,1. 
Ofgem (2015a:2) defines codes as ‘the contractual arrangements that underpin the operation of 
the electricity and gas industry’. As a result they influence the way companies act within the 
market and many aspects of codes therefore have significant commercial implications. Network 
actors are also required to use the appropriate technical standards documents for network 
planning and operation. It is possible for companies to depart from what is specified in technical 
codes and standards, but to do so they must seek derogation from Ofgem.  
 
Compared to high-level energy policy, codes are rarely debated publicly, and they remain 
largely invisible to those outside the industry. But because they define the terms under which 
participants can access networks and operate in markets they actually play a critical role in 
determining how far energy systems are able to realise the trilemma goals of sustainability, 
security and affordability. 
 
For any aspect of energy policy to function well, regulation including industry codes must be 
sufficiently aligned with that policy. A good example of why this alignment is important is the 
situation that arose in the 2000s with the rapid growth of wind power, especially in Scotland. 
The expansion of renewable energy was a high-level policy objective for the UK. Transmission 
Owners (TOs) are subject to price controls, part of which considers upcoming connections to 
their  
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network. Under licence, TOs and the System Operator (SO) must agree a 10 year Network 
Plan. These two elements highly influence renewable generation connections, and any changes 
to the process for delivery filter down to codes.  
 
Existing rules on connection to the transmission network in the Connection and Use of Services 
Code (CUSC) specified that connection could not be made until any necessary reinforcement 
work in the wider network had taken place, an arrangement known as ‘Invest and Connect’. 
This approach led to long delays in new wind power projects being able to connect and start 
generating. A number of different attempts to change the CUSC were made, many of which 
were rejected within the narrow objectives of the code, and eventually in 2007 the government 
stepped in and undertook a review of transmission access.2 In 2010, a new approach was 
brought in by government, in which wind farms were connected ahead of any necessary 
reinforcement work, with the system operator managing any constraints, i.e. ‘Connect and 
Manage’. In this case, code governance failed to solve the problem and direct government 
intervention was needed, but there was a significant delay between problems arising in the early 
2000s and the solution being reached.  
 
Thus the central overarching issue for codes is how they can keep up with the major changes in 
energy, especially electricity. As one supplier put it recently, the content of codes ‘was created 
at the dawning of the energy market when big power stations and big companies dominated. 
Little of it anticipated a world where decentralised technologies such as wind and solar would be 
producing 24% of the UK’s electricity.’3 Energy industry codes in Britain were established at 
various times over the last 20 years. Commercial codes, covering contractual relationships 
between energy industry actors, were established during the process of privatisation,4 while the 
technical codes covering the operation and planning of networks and power plants have their 
origins in the pre-privatisation post-War period.5 But the energy system is now seeing the rapid 
development of intermittent renewable electricity generation, decentralised production of both 
heat and electricity, a much greater role for demand side flexibility and the much wider use of 
ICTs in energy systems. To capture the benefits of change and to minimise the costs of 
transformation, it is necessary that industry codes change at the same rate as the energy 
industry. As the CMA puts it: 
 
‘The GB energy industry is undergoing a period of significant change, driven not only by the 
need to tackle climate change but also by factors such as technological development (for 
example, the smart meter agenda and the development of demand-side response 
technologies). In order for industry and consumers to capture the benefits of change and 
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minimise the costs of transition, it is necessary that industry codes develop at the same rate as 
the energy industry.’ CMA (2015c: 461) 
 
Table 1: Energy industry codes and standards in Great Britain 
 
Area Title Description 
Electricity 
distribution 
Distribution Code (D-Code) Technical parameters relating to the 
planning and use of electricity distribution 
networks 
Distribution Connection and 
Use of System Agreement 
(DCUSA) 
Covers commercial aspects of use of 
electricity distribution network services 
Electricity 
transmission 
Connection and Use of 
System Code (CUSC) 
Framework for connection and use of high 
voltage transmission system and certain 
balancing services 
Grid Code Technical aspects relating to connections, 
operation & use of transmission network 
System 
Operator/Transmission Code 
(STC) 
Defines the relationships between National 
Grid as system operator and transmission   
owners  
Electricity 
balancing 
Balancing and Settlement 
Code (BSC) 
Sets out rules for participating in Balancing 
Mechanism and for settling energy 
imbalance 
Electricity 
retailing 
Master Registration 
Agreement (MRA) 
Rules for retail market processes including 
electricity registration, change of supplier 
processes and the Green Deal 
Gas 
transmission 
and distribution 
Unified Network Code (UNC) Defines the rights and responsibilities for 
users of the gas transportation systems, 
and provides for all system users to have 
equal access to transportation services 
Gas retailing Supply Point Administration 
Agreement (SPAA) 
Sets out the inter-operational 
arrangements between gas suppliers and 
transporters in the UK retail market 
Gas and 
electricity smart 
metering 
Smart Energy Code (SEC) Defines the rights and obligations of 
energy suppliers, network operators and 
other relevant parties involved in the end 
to end management of smart metering in 
Great Britain. 
 
Source: Licences, Code and Standard documents 
 
2. History of reform efforts 
 
At the heart of this challenge of modernising codes is the issue of code governance. The basic 
principle up until the late 2000s was largely one of self-governance. Changes to codes (often 
called ‘modifications’) were overseen by a panel or similar body made up mainly of 
representatives from the energy industry itself, with a code administrator running the change 
process day-to-day and reporting to the panel. After assessing change proposals and consulting 
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industry, the panel would then put a recommendation to Ofgem, which made the final decision 
and published a rationale for that decision within the terms of its duties.  
 
In 2007, a major review of code governance was initiated by Ofgem.6 This review was driven by 
two concerns: problems in amending codes to support the delivery of major reforms in key 
policy areas, especially to meet the low-carbon imperative, and the fragmented and complex 
nature of code processes which made it difficult for small suppliers and renewable generators to 
participate fairly and effectively.7 The Code Governance Review ran from 2008 to 2013 and 
introduced three major reforms: 
 The existing modification process added two new routes for changing codes: a fast-track 
‘self-governance’ route for minor modifications with ‘non-material’ impacts which would not 
require Ofgem approval, and the Significant Code Review (SCR) in which Ofgem would 
instigate changes to align codes with the requirements of high-level policy. In an SCR 
Ofgem would prepare the ground by carrying out analysis of changes needed and their likely 
impacts, but still had to rely on an industry party to raise a modification on its behalf.  
 The introduction of a Code Administration Code of Practice (CACoP):8 a non-binding set of 
principles and processes that code administrators were expected to follow with the objective 
of standardising practices across codes and making change processes more 
transparent. The CACoP specified that code administrators should act as ‘critical friends’, 
meaning that they provide support to all parties, but pay ‘particular attention to under-
represented parties, small market participants and consumer representatives’. 
 A requirement in BSC, CUSC and UNC licence conditions for panels to make an 
assessment of the carbon impact of a proposed modification where appropriate.9 
 
These changes have had an impact on the governance of industry codes. However, despite the 
CGR many of the underlying problems persisted, and in the last 18 months two further reviews 
of code governance have been launched: (i) a consideration of codes in the 2014  
energy market investigation being undertaken by the Competition and Markets Authority 
(CMA),10 and (ii) a further review by Ofgem in 2015.11 These reviews are attempting to address 
a range of issues, many of which are the same as those raised in the original Code Governance 
Review in 2008,12 including: 
 The length of time it takes to make changes to codes, especially the major changes made 
through a Significant Code Review 
 The difficulty of making and coordinating changes that involve more than one code 
 Change processes lacking the vires to ensure codes reflect the transformation facing the 
industry 
 Present and future consumer interests not sufficiently considered in change processes 
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 Code objectives not aligned with Ofgem’s duties 
 The sheer complexity of codes themselves 
 The large numbers of meetings that actors have to attend to track code changes 
 Minor changes are still going to Ofgem for final approval 
 Governance arrangements, collateral requirements and levels of service by code 
administrators vary across codes 
 Incumbents (Big 6 suppliers vertically integrated in electricity, the major distribution network 
operators and National Grid) dominate panels, working groups and in some cases voting. 
 
The focus of the CMA investigation is on competition and the welfare of consumers. It has 
reached a provisional conclusion that despite reforms under the CGR, code governance 
arrangements can lead to ‘inconsistent or delayed outcomes’ for code change and creates 
‘material burdens’ on industry actors, especially smaller ones, all of which are creating an 
adverse effect on competition.13 The CMA is proposing three possible ‘remedies’. These all 
relate to the relationships between bodies within the code governance set-up: 
 
 Make code administration and/or implementation of codes changes a licensable activity. 
This reform would allow Ofgem to monitor performance, give directions, and impose 
sanctions, with the aim of producing more consistency across codes and accelerating code 
changes, especially cross-code changes. 
 Grant Ofgem more powers to project-manage and/or control timetable of the process of 
developing and/or implementing code changes. This reform would complement existing 
SCR powers and is aimed at enabling Ofgem to ensure that mod proposals that further 
consumer interests are implemented in a timely and efficient way. 
 Appointment of an independent code adjudicator to determine which code changes 
should be adopted in the case of dispute. This reform is aimed at resolving disagreements 
more quickly. The adjudicator would need to take on Ofgem’s powers to approve/refuse 
modification proposals in these cases, plus extra powers to project-manage and/or control 
timetables. 
 
Ofgem’s further review of code governance takes account of the CMA process, and is aimed 
explicitly at incremental improvements to the reforms introduced through the earlier CGR. 
Launched in May 2015, the review published Initial Proposals in October 2015.14 It proposes 
changes in four areas: 
 
 Significant Code Reviews: a new power for Ofgem itself to lead the process of major code 
revisions from start to end, including the power to raise modifications itself. In the 
instance that Ofgem directs an industry code member to raise an SCR modification it can 
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set a timetable for it to progress to a recommendation. This proposal clearly overlaps closely 
with the second of the CMA reform ideas. 
 Self-governance: a shift to having to make the case why proposals should not be self-
governance (rather than the other way round as at present). There should also be explicit 
criteria, ideally common across all codes, for deciding when a change should be handled 
under self-governance or not. 
 Code administration: a number of changes strengthening expectations of code 
administrators and panels, including the requirement that all codes panels should have an 
independent chair, and that every code change proposal form should have a section on 
consumer impacts. 
 Charging methodologies: establish a more developed, informal pre-modification process, 
and a forward workplan for ‘priority’ charging areas. 
 
In addition, industry actors and observers have contributed ideas for reform in their submissions 
to the consultation processes accompanying the CMA and Ofgem reviews. A summary of our 
interpretation of their responses is provided in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Ideas for Code Reform 
 
Changes to 
codes 
Consolidate (and simplify) codes Citizen’s Advice, Elexon, 
Good Energy, SSE 
New code objective on consumers Citizen’s Advice, Elexon, 
Good Energy 
   
Changes to code 
modification and 
administration 
processes 
Standardise governance arrangements to 
best practice across all codes (including 
independent panels, better representation 
for smaller participants etc) 
EdF, Cornwall Energy, 
RWE npower, Ecotricity, 
Opus Energy, SSE, 
Gemserv 
Greater oversight of code administrators EdF 
   
Changes to 
governance 
architecture 
Cross-code expert group (resuscitate 
Cross-Code Forum) 
Elexon, First Utility, Opus 
Energy 
Single code administrator and/or centralised 
code management system 
RWE npower, Cornwall 
Energy, Good Energy, 
First Utility, Gemserv 
Design Authority EnergyUK, RWE npower, 
IET, Cornwall Energy, 
SSE, BG 
Independent adjudicator to replace Ofgem RWE npower, Cornwall 
Energy 
Source: Lockwood 201515 
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3. Key issues raised at the Codes Governance Workshop 
 
The Energy Policy Group (EPG) hosted a Codes Governance Workshop on 16 October 2015. 
The agenda and attendees can be found on the IGov website. The workshop was divided into 
two sessions covering what EPG considered to be the two key issues: Session 1: Discussion of 
code simplification, consolidation and administration; and Session 2: Discussion of code 
governance architecture. Below we summarise some of the key areas of discussion, in respect 
to: 1) Access to Information; 2) Code Simplification & Consolidation; and 3) Code Governance, 
Administration and Architecture. These issues are interlinked.  
 
A number of key issues were raised over the day. Although there was much agreement over 
what the issues are, there were essentially two fundamentally differing approaches to how best 
to solve them (with a range of suggestions between them):  
 ‘steady as she goes’ with incremental change via continuing self-regulation OR  
 fundamental change where code administration comes together in one body, and alterations 
to codes occur not as a result of self-regulation but in line with the needs of the efficient 
system transformation and operation, albeit with a means for arbitration.  
 
In general, therefore, there was agreement on certain issues, for example that clarity on Code 
Objectives is needed, but there was no consensus for the next step of how those objectives 
should be implemented.  
 
In the discussion below we have highlighted under each topic those areas where we feel there 
was agreement or consensus on a topic, as well as where there was less agreement. It should 
be highlighted that this is our interpretation of the discussions and therefore does not 
necessarily reflect any individual’s view.  
 
 
3.1 Improving information and access 
One area of discussion focussed on access to information on codes and how this could be 
improved, this included the detail of individual codes as well as how different codes link 
together. This was particularly an issue for new entrants and other actors seeking to understand 
the codes, but in respect to understanding how different codes link together and impact each 
other, it also seems to be an issue for those already working within the code environment.  
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3.1.1 Areas of consensus 
Generally it was felt that it would be beneficial, particularly for those working outside of the 
detailed code environment, if clearer information on each code could be provided. This would 
include setting out in clear English basic things like: what the objective of the code is, the type of 
code it is, how it evolved and how it relates to other codes, etc.  
 
Given the complexity of codes (see below), there was agreement that there are some relatively 
easy opportunities to make codes more accessible to stakeholders. This could include 
improving the information and support provided through the ‘critical friend’ process, as well as 
better information provision. For example, in terms of individual codes it was recognised that 
different people need different levels of information on the codes, so a possible way forward 
would be to have layers of information for each code to suit different audiences – linked to 
better guidance and support. It was suggested that actors sometimes just want to know what 
they have to do to become compliant with any given code. In addition, actors need to 
understand how to be compliant with any particular issue, which might cut across different 
codes. It was highlighted how difficult it is to navigate around the different codes, so better 
support and guidance on how all the codes fit together would also be of benefit. 
 
One suggestion was that this could be provided by a one-stop-shop as currently there is no 
single person or organisation that someone can go to get cross code information. For example, 
they could explain what steps any given supplier, generator or other licensee must take to be  
complaint with section X, Y and Z of any code/codes, found in Sections 1, 2, and 3, etc. 
All of this would improve the transparency of codes. 
 
3.2 Code simplification/consolidation 
It was recognised that in codes are long and complex and in some cases are written in legalese 
which makes them hard to understand, even for some working within the code environment. 
This in part links to the points above in terms of how to access information and understand what 
the detail of a code requires of an actor. Discussions on this led in to a broader consideration of 
what the opportunities and barriers might be to simplify individual codes and/or consolidate the 
number of codes. This was an area of discussion were there were many differing views. 
 
3.2.1 Areas with consensus 
It was recognised that neither the individual codes nor the introduction of modifications to them 
give much or any consideration to consumers. This was seen as an oversight that should be 
addressed, and most agreed that the impact of code modifications should take account of how 
the change could impact the end consumer (both current and future).  
 
                                        9 
 
As highlighted above, the codes play an important role in ensuring technical standards are met 
and play a commercial role in setting out contractual arrangements that underpin the energy 
industry, thus helping to avoid disputes and providing certainty for actors. However, this 
certainty had come at a cost in terms of complexity and accessibility of the codes, particularly 
for smaller actors; but even for larger actors, it was questioned if adding more and more pages 
to a code does actually bring more certainty. It was also highlighted that it might be possible to 
simplify codes as a set of principles rather than detailed rules (as is the case in some 
Scandinavian countries), although some also felt that this approach might lead to disputes and 
uncertainty within the British context. It was recognised by most that there is probably an 
optimal area between the large complex codes and smaller principle based codes, although no 
clear agreement on where the ideal balance lies.  
 
Whilst there was no clear agreement over the need for simplification or any consolidation, there 
was general agreement that if this did happen a number of important considerations should be 
taken into account. This seemed to come down to three main areas:  
 ensuring that any changes did not create instability in the market 
 rights and obligations should not be disregarded, as this would lead to legal challenges 
 any costs of making changes are considered alongside the benefits that any change might 
bring. 
 
Given these sorts of issues, it was recognised that if any changes occurred there would need to 
be real clarity over what is being changed and why it needs to change i.e. what problem is the 
change addressing, what is going to happen, by when, by whom and what can actors expect. In 
addition, people felt that how the change is communicated would be important. An open, 
transparent process, which is consulted upon with industry, was felt to be a better way to reduce 
the potential risks of lengthy litigation. Ultimately any changes to code texts would need to be 
clear, easy to understand, and easy to apply.  
 
3.2.2 Areas without consensus  
In respect to simplification there was no overall consensus. There were quite a few ideas put 
forward: would it be possible to scrap the 1000 pages of codes for new signatories and a 20 
page note replace it? Should there be a new, short frontispiece for codes, and the current codes 
remain? If any simplification is introduced could it include setting out key principles, based on 
things like consistency, simplification, accessibility of information? 
 
Some felt that it would be important to differentiate between codes covering commercial to 
commercial (or B2B) interactions, and those governing commercial to retail (or B2C) as different  
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kinds of rules are needed to regulate these different kinds of corporate relations. Equally, some 
felt if changes do occur, there could be value in looking at what the main drivers on the markets 
are and make any amendments accordingly, e.g. in wholesale markets the EU has become a 
significant driver. 
 
Some felt that there was need for clearer objectives in respect to individual codes, although 
others felt that some codes have served, and continue to serve, the industry well. It was 
recognised that much of the details of codes is about contracting issues between consenting 
parties that don’t impact on end-users, the details of these are therefore not relevant to many 
beyond the consenting parties. As well as the codes, there are also subsidiary documents, 
clauses, legal text, etc, which again is not relevant to business operation. This links back to the 
issues around access to information and some felt that codes could be made clearer (not 
necessarily simplified) by layering the information within them. This restructuring of the 
information could happen vertically within codes, although some felt it was also needed across 
codes.  
 
In respect to modifications, there was some suggestion that there should be a new template 
used for their introduction and that mods should include overt recognition of: consumers, 
sustainability, innovation, new entrants, etc. Others argued that before this could be done new  
guidelines are needed, e.g. that define consumer interests given that, as currently written, 
codes just assume that consumer interests are more or less equal to competition and extend no 
further.  
 
Another issue that was highlighted was that currently the objectives of individual codes do not 
match the objectives of Ofgem, which for some did not make sense. Others were not sure if this 
mattered or whether it should be changed  
 
In terms of code consolidation there was no agreement on whether the many codes currently in 
place should be consolidated into a few codes, and whether the benefit of doing this would 
outweigh the costs. Some also felt that consolidation might happen anyway as a result of 
ongoing changes to markets.  
 
3.3 Code governance, administration and architecture  
The final section of this discussion paper sets out the debates that were held broadly in relation 
to code governance. Much of the discussion in these areas ran into each other and there are 
therefore many overlaps within the summary below. In part, some of the discussions were 
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based on two diagrams that IGov presented at the workshop, reproduced below, which set out 
our own thoughts about how governance might change. Figure 1 takes a high level view of  
codes within the wider governance landscape, whilst Figure 2 provides a more detailed look at a 
model for code governance. We are continuing to work on these figures and they therefore are 
likely to be amended in due course. 
 
Figure 1: Codes in the wider governance landscape 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A possible model for code governance 
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3.3.1 Areas with consensus 
a) In terms of high level governance: 
 There seemed to be two high level issues running through some of the discussions, in 
respect to: a) Who sets the agenda (Ofgem, DECC, or another body); and b) who is then 
responsible for ensuring the delivery of that agenda. This seemed to particularly be an 
issue when an initiative cut across different codes and highlighted the need for strategic 
decision-making in the code environment (which some felt is currently lacking).  
 The need for coordination and being able to 'see' across codes was recognised by many 
as a desirable and important change.  
 A key issue for all actors appeared to be constraints around their time and staff resource 
i.e. Ofgem, DECC, the big suppliers and new entrants. This could impact changes to 
codes and code governance in the long term.  
 
b) In terms of code governance:  
 That it is essential that the hierarchy of layers of authority and function in code 
governance (who takes decisions – who executes – what each layer can and should do) 
should be clear.  
 Panels, when passing or rejecting a modification, should be setting out detailed pros and 
cons. At the moment, the explanation is often very sparse.  
 Modifications often reflect major policy issues, and their outcomes effectively become 
policy. It was agreed that fundamental policy decisions should not be debated within a 
Panel but should come directed from a democratically legitimate policy process. An 
example of this was modifications about ‘peaky’ cash out prices. Some support it and 
say that it will empower customers; others consider that it will make renewable 
development more risky.  
 There is a very limited capacity within GB of people who really know the codes, and still 
fewer people understand all the codes, and those who do are working either in the Code 
Administrators and/or Panels or within industry. In particular informed actors can be 
found within big companies; or in consultancies like Cornwall Energy who specialise in 
advising smaller entrants; or sometimes in a smaller company that have someone 
responsible for the codes of that company. Whatever changes occur, GB cannot afford 
to lose its already small capacity, knowledge and skills in this complex area.  
 While it was not agreed what code governance changes are required (as discussed 
below), it was agreed that whether changes are reasonably minimal, or greater, the 
Code Panels and Administrators need to understand their impacts on different parties 
across codes as well on individual codes; which implies a need for more coordination. In 
addition, the roles of other institutions in relation to governance change need to be 
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understood. For example, what should the role of Ofgem be within future code 
governance change? All of these relationships should be set out in Strategic and Policy 
Statements. 
 
c) In respect to code administrators: 
 There was some agreement about the need for greater coordination between code 
administrators and/or for one body to be able to think across codes. The Code 
Administrators have already initiated improved coordination, but it was accepted that 
there could be more. It should also be noted that Code Administrators wanted to retain 
their independence and did not want there to be one single Code Body.  
 Code administrators play a neutral role are basically passive, but there was a general 
view that it would be useful if they were more proactive. However, they are not set up to 
be active, so if a new role for them is wanted then their remits and objectives would have 
to be altered.  
 There was a general feeling that thinking of them as code managers, rather than 
administrators, would be a good first step in moving them to a more pro-active role. 
 
 
3.3.2 Areas without consensus  
 
a) In terms of high level governance: 
 IGov put forward in the meeting our initial thinking around high level governance – i.e. 
Figures 1 and 2 above, and we have a forthcoming working paper that will further examine 
these. Within the IGov proposal there is an Integrated Independent System Operator (IISO) 
which is given responsibility from DECC to enable the technical transformation of the energy 
system so that it reduces emissions by 80% by 2050, as specified in the Climate Change 
Act 2008, and to maintain security whilst doing that. The IISO would, for example, decide 
what technical changes were required to networks and the energy system transitions. The 
Code Administrator Body would then work out the necessary modifications, and there would 
be a process for discussion amongst industry. There would also be an Expert Independent 
Arbitration body to which those who disagreed on the Code Modifications could appeal. The 
Economic Regulator would regulate the networks based on IISO decisions. This gets rid of 
Code Panels and self-regulation and reflects a view that codes are technical requirements. 
This is only one suggestion and others were presented at the Workshop, which we will seek 
to add to the IGov website, with the authors permission. There were a wide range of 
discussions on the differing ideas put forward and no obvious consensus over the best way 
forward.  
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 It was also raised that there should be a more direct link between codes and government 
energy policy and objectives. At the moment Code Administrators do not need to link the 
codes, or code changes, to formal public policy objectives of climate change mitigation, 
improving GB energy poverty and energy security. For example, the Committee on Climate 
Change sets out various technology paths to meet the emission reductions targets but there 
is currently no need for the codes to be compliant with that, nor indeed to consider current or 
future consumers. 
 
b) In terms of the code governance:  
 A key area of debate was around the issue of self-governance i.e. industry initiatives code 
changes and whether this should change.  
 This area is part of wider questions about institutional reform in energy governance. On the 
whole, those who support a Code Administrator, which is able to take code decisions 
(thereby speeding up the process) recognise that wider institutional reform is needed.   
 There was no consensus on who would have responsibility to make the modification 
changes. This was in part because there was also no consensus on whether there should 
be a single Code Administrator or whether the Code Administrators continue as they are; 
and if there is one Code Administrator, who would make decisions on what modifications  
have to happen. Would it continue to be via separate codes and panels within the Code 
Administrator; or could the Administrators initiative mods for panels to consider; or would 
there be higher strategic guidance?  
 It was highlighted that Code Panels have two roles but that these maybe should be 
separated out. Partly they are cooperative because they sit together to ensure the Code 
Administrator is operating efficiently, the code is operating efficiently and that are budgets 
being properly managed, etc. However, they also look at the modifications to legal text 
within the code and this has commercial implications for them. It was suggested by some 
that having more proactive Code Administrators (see below) that put forward 
recommendations and made decisions could remove the concern about panels being 
populated by groups that have material interests in the outcome of a modification. 
 Some also felt that panels should be required to be more pro-active and strategic, working 
across codes. And that working groups should be more enabling and advisory in nature. 
 There was also discussion on the need to try and align code processes. Some felt that, in 
terms of the process of change, there should be a standard format for modifications or 
changing governance for a code. However, others highlighted that the codes have individual 
governance structures in place, so that decisions within panels, are often based on the 
individual principles and objectives of that code and of the parties that are within it. This 
makes it hard to take standard approaches to change across codes. 
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c) In respect to code administrators: 
 They could have different roles: i) they can be reasonably passive administrators who 
execute decisions taken elsewhere; or ii) they can be more active and strategic, potentially 
shaping and inputting ideas to further the objectives of the code, ensuring they are being 
met. Some felt this should go further and that the Administrator should be able to raise 
modifications. This would see them acting as independent bodies, raising changes for 
industry actors to consider.  
 It is possible to think of different levels of Code Administrator service: e.g. ‘bronze’, ‘silver’ 
and ‘gold’. ’Bronze’ level would be about making the process work and relying on industry to 
provide the intellect, as compared to a ‘gold’ level which could be a highly resourced and 
proactive service which goes beyond current practice i.e. managing and driving the code. 
Some felt that the ‘gold service’ is what we should be aiming for.  
 If Code Administrators did take a more strategic role, some felt it would be important to put 
in place mechanisms to ensure they could be held to account, such as time limited contracts 
that would require them to tender for the work every few years.  
 
 There was also some discussion about whether code administrators should be ‘co-located’ 
in the same building: 
o This could potentially ease coordination, increase accessibility of codes/licenses for 
new people and increase availability of expertise. Such a model could have a strong 
secretariat that does code administration and practice, and a strong education team 
that provides advice and expertise to industry actors.  
o Co-location might also help with any efforts to consolidate codes. 
o Some suggested that it might also help to reduce costs, as some centralised 
functions like HR, communications, etc could be shared. 
o It was however questioned whether having one overall code manager or governance 
body could understand and manage all the rules. 
 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
Energy industry codes play a crucial role in shaping the energy system. Major changes in codes 
will be needed as the industry, especially the electricity industry, undergoes transformation to a 
low-carbon decentralised system, with new business models, new flows of data and new 
markets. Code governance, and in particular the process by which changes are made to codes, 
needs to be sufficiently flexible to avoid a situation where codes are a barrier to meeting policy 
objectives and to new market entrants, as has been the case on several occasions in the past. 
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The last seven years have seen a number of reforms to who governs industry codes, what 
processes are involved, and what needs to be considered in the change process. Despite these 
reforms, many of the problems identified in the original 2008 Code Governance Review remain. 
As of late 2015 two official reviews, by the Competition and Markets Authority and by Ofgem, 
were still ongoing. However, both of these reviews are limited in scope. The CMA review is 
limited by the terms of reference of the wider energy market investigation, with a relatively 
narrow focus on competition and harm to current consumers. The Ofgem 2015 review explicitly 
considers only incremental changes to the framework set up by the earlier 2008 Code 
Governance Review. 
 
Crucially, both of these official reviews do not consider potential changes to code governance 
within the context of reform to the governance of the wider energy system. For example, they do 
not address the question of how code governance should relate to a widely called-for body that 
would steer the transition to a low-carbon decentralised energy system.16 They do not raise the 
question of whether it is appropriate for Ofgem to be the body overseeing code governance in  
terms, for example, of whether Ofgem has the resources, expertise and democratic legitimacy 
to undertake this task efficiently and effectively. They do not investigate whether the deeper 
function that codes fulfil, i.e. the governance of contractual relationships in the energy sector, is 
better served through the current approach of the detailed rulebooks that codes represent, or 
through the approach seen in some other countries in which a brief set of principles sits on top 
of a series of bilateral contracts. The current reviews also do not question the fundamental 
principle of industry self-governance.17  
 
Thus while the CMA and Ofgem reviews are welcome, we argue that they do not necessarily 
address the much broader range of views currently on offer, and as evidenced by the 
discussion in this workshop, including fundamental questions around self-regulation. Therefore 
we argue that the Government should instigate a more thorough review of code 
governance, including potential changes to the architecture within the context of wider 
changes to energy sector governance. An increasing number of proposals for such wider 
changes are being made. We have already published two iterations of our Draft Proposal, 
including our earlier Public Value Energy Governance working paper, and we will be publishing 
a further detailed working paper on code governance in the coming weeks. Our thinking on 
code governance reform is informed by our wider IGov work on the governance of the energy 
system as a whole, and we will also be publishing further papers on this during 2016.  
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* Amendments: the following changes were made to this paper in December 2015: 
 Context: removal of phrase ‘10 main industry codes’ from body text and title of Table 1 – we recognise that 
codes and markets are all interconnected. 
 Table 1: amendment to entry on MRA and inclusion of SPAA 
 Section 3.3.1 section c):  changed description of code administrators, from playing passive role, to neutral role. 
This more accurately reflects the role they play, both within the rules that govern them under the individual codes 
and taking account of the changes introduced under CACoP.  
